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Effects of feedback on performance and response latencies in untimed 
reasoning tests 
 
Jens F. Beckmann1, and Nadin Beckmann 
 
Abstract 
In an experimental study, a set of 12 number series problems with open-answer format had 
to be solved by a sample of 120 eighth and ninth graders randomly assigned to one of two 
test conditions (standard condition: no feedback; feedback condition: correct/incorrect 
item-by-item feedback). Task-related self-confidence and worry was measured before and 
after the performance test. Overall, results suggest that simple correct/incorrect feedback 
in performance tests does not provide the examinee with helpful information. Rather, it 
increases the level of worry, which tends to result in poorer performance. Moreover, the 
provision of feedback had no systematic effect on examinees’ time behavior. The findings 
give no support for the assumption that time behavior in untimed performance tests is at 
least partially determined by non-intellectual variables such as self-confidence and worry.  
 
Keywords: feedback, intelligence tests, response latencies, I > C phenomenon, confidence, 
worry  
 
Feedback in performance tests 
Feedback in the framework of psychological assessment is seen as an important 
intervention strategy to facilitate performance on tests. Within the concept of dynamic 
testing (Guthke & Wiedl, 1996; Guthke, Beckmann & Wiedl, 2003, see also Sternberg & 
Grigorenko, 2002), feedback is used to induce intraindividual differences in performance 
scores. In learning tests, for instance (Beckmann & Guthke, 1999), interindividual 
differences in the profit from feedback and elaborated thinking prompts has been proven 
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2  Effects of Feedback 
to be a more valid indicator for an examinee’s intellectual capacity than have test scores in 
traditional, feedback-free assessment procedures (Beckmann, 2001).  
The implementation of feedback in performance tests in general is driven by the 
assumption that feedback will provide the examinee with useful information about his or 
her success in attempts to tackle the problems. It is expected that this information might be 
helpful to improve the examinee’s performance on succeeding items within the test. 
However, feedback can be interpreted not only as a source of task-related information to 
the problem solver, but also as a source of information about his or her level of skills and 
abilities. Under this perspective, feedback might influence task motivation. The foundation 
for this research was laid by Thorndike’s law of effect (Thorndike, 1911, 1932; Skinner, 
1969). Based on the reinforcement approach, feedback⎯positive feedback in 
particular⎯results in positive effects in task motivation and henceforth in performance. 
This behavioristic approach has been overtaken by the cognitive perspective on feedback. 
This perspective allows one to conceptualize not only the effects of processing task-
related information and its effect on performance, but also the effects of processing self-
related information and its motivational effects.     
There is also a considerably large body of research using non-contingent feedback. 
What we can learn from these studies is that the individual fit between the feedback 
received and the academic self-concept plays a crucial role whether feedback has a 
positive, negative or zero effect on performance. But the all over picture is anything but 
clear. Based on his study, Bossong (1982) has suggested that a perceived discrepancy 
between feedback and academic self-concept will result in an effort adjustment. That is to 
say, in the case of a positive discrepancy (feedback is more positive than the self-concept) 
the level of effort will be reduced, which might lead to a decrease in performance. The 
reaction to a negative discrepancy (feedback is more negative than expected, based on the 
self-concept) will be an increase in effort and henceforth in performance. However, other 
researchers such as Shrauger and Rosenberg (1970) have stated that feedback does have an 
impact on performance only if there is no discrepancy between feedback information and 
the level of self-esteem. Poor performers receiving rather negative feedback tend to show 
a decrease in performance, whereas good performers benefit from contingent positive 
feedback. In other words, feedback is good for the good ones and bad for the not so good 
ones (see also Meyer & Starke, 1981/1982; Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1982).  
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A third position emphasizes the importance of congruence between self-concept 
and feedback independently from the type of the feedback (e.g., Stake, 1982). Congruent 
feedback positively influences performance, however incongruent feedback causes 
confusion and interferes with cognitive processes necessary to deal with the tasks. That is, 
examinees with high levels of self-esteem tend to profit from positive feedback, whereas 
examinees with low self-esteem might find negative feedback to be beneficial (see also 
within the framework of self regulation theory: Idson & Higgins, 2000; Förster, Grant, 
Idson & Higgins, 2001; Van-Dijk & Kluger, 2004). 
Coming back to studies employing performance-contingent feedback, we are 
confronted with empirical evidence suggesting that feedback intervention effects on 
performance are quite variable (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996, p. 254). In some conditions, 
feedback improves performance, in others, no effect on performance can be found, and in 
still other conditions, feedback can debilitate performance. Kluger and DeNisi’s (1996) 
meta-analysis included 131 studies dealing with performance-related feedback effects in 
different settings. Surprisingly, more than a third of the 607 effects reported were 
negative. The overall effect size reported by Kluger and DeNisi was d = 0.41. Similar 
results were also revealed in a meta-analysis conducted by Bangert-Drowns, Kulik, Kulik 
and Morgan (1991), where 18 out of 58 feedback effects were negative, resulting in an 
overall effect size of d = 0.26. 
What are the reasons for the high variability in the pattern of results of these 
feedback studies? Explanations can be expected from two perspectives: the situation-
oriented perspective and the person-oriented perspective. An important situational 
characteristic that potentially moderates the effects of feedback is the level of elaboration 
of the feedback intervention itself. The level of elaboration ranges from simple 
correct/incorrect feedback as it is sometimes more or less deliberately—but nonetheless in 
contradiction to all rules of standardized testing—provided in individual intelligence 
assessment procedures, to the other pole of this continuum, marked by the highly 
individualized but standardized error-related thinking prompts as they are provided in 
learning tests (see e.g., Guthke & Beckmann, 2000a). The lower the level of elaboration 
(e.g., simple correct/incorrect), the less likely the chances are to benefit from this kind of 
feedback (e.g., Kulhavy, 1977) and to improve performance. 
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From a person-related perspective it is of particular relevance how the recipient 
processes the information provided as feedback. The question arises whether feedback is 
interpreted as a potential threat to self-esteem or whether the focus of attention is put on 
problem-relevant characteristics within the situation. Whereas the latter activates 
potentially beneficial cognitions about how to bridge the perceived feedback-standard 
discrepancy, the former results in less productive worry cognitions. Again, the less 
specific the feedback is in respect to information about successful problem-solving 
strategies, the more likely the chances are that the feedback—particularly the feedback 
“wrong” after an unsuccessful attempt to solve a problem—will be perceived merely as a 
negative evaluation of the examinee’s own ability. 
According to Meijer (2001) and Meijer and Elshout (2001), a lack of self-
confidence is the central component of test anxiety. Anxious persons tend to interpret 
external and potentially evaluative stimuli in performance situations as threatening to their 
self-esteem (Sarason & Spielberger, 1975). Test anxiety or a lack of self-confidence can 
be seen as important performance-limiting personality factors that not only prevent 
potential profit from feedback, but could even enlarge the discrepancy between the 
manifest performance and the level of “true” ability (competency) in performance 
situations. 
Moreover, it might be necessary to overcome the still dominant result-related 
perspective in feedback research that is primarily focused on test scores (number of correct 
responses). There is the need to consider process indicators to gain more insight about the 
mechanism of feedback (non-)effects. In other words, we should widen the perspective 
from analyzing problem-solving results to an investigation of the problem-solving process. 
One way is to use response latencies in our attempts to better understand the effects of 
feedback on the problem-solving process. 
Latencies in untimed reasoning tests 
Within the framework of intelligence assessment in power tests, examinees are presented 
with a set of increasingly complex items without a time limit. The more problems that are 
solved in these tests, the higher the level of successfully mastered item complexity. The 
number of correct responses represents the estimator for the examinee’s level of ability.  
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With the increasing employment of computerized test administration, not only can 
the responses be registered but also the time needed to answer each single item. This 
development and the old call for a more process-oriented evaluation of performance 
behavior in intelligence tests in general led to the reanimation of the interest in latencies in 
untimed reasoning tests (see, for example, Baxter, 1941; Ebel, 1953; Iseler, 1970; Nährer, 
1982; Necka, 1992; Phillips & Rabbitt, 1995). 
Besides the development in test presentation, recording, and scoring techniques, 
the theoretical understanding of the meaning of latencies is still quite limited. It is not 
clear yet to what extent latencies are meaningful indicators of task characteristics such as 
complexity (cf. Ebel, 1953). From a rather person-related perspective, the even more 
interesting, differentially-oriented question is whether response latencies in untimed 
intelligence tests can be seen either as additional indicators of the participants’ intellectual 
capacity (e.g., speed of information processing, see, for example, Danthiir, Wilhelm & 
Schacht in this issue), or if they should rather be interpreted as indicators for non-
intellectual personality factors (personal tempo, impulsivity, test anxiety, self-confidence, 
see Preckel & Freund and Troche & Rammsayer in this issue). In the former case, 
latencies would be more or less redundant to the test score (number correct) or at best they 
might serve as a kind of “backup indicator” for the examinee’s ability (c.f. Hornke, 1997; 
see also Dörfler & Beckmann, 2003). In the latter case we would gain additional insight 
into the interplay of intellectual capacities and performance-related, non-intellectual 
personality factors during the process of dealing with the task complexity. However, so far 
no clear evidence could be found for that claim (no relationship between latencies and 
cognitive style such as impulsivity: Beckmann, 1999; Beckmann, 2000b; no relationship 
between latencies and neuroticism, extraversion, psychoticism, anxiety or need for 
achievement: Rammsayer, 1999). In any case, progress in understanding the meaning of 
response latencies in this setting will give us the chance to increase the quality of 
assessment tools employed in this field.  
In recent studies dealing with response latencies in untimed performance tests, it 
has consistently been replicated that latencies for incorrect answers were longer than those 
for correct ones (Hornke, 1997; Beckmann, Guthke & Vahle, 1997; Beckmann, 2000a; 
Hornke, 2000; Rammsayer, 1999; Rammsayer & Brandler, 2003). This so called 
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Incorrect > Correct phenomenon (I > C phenomenon2) is characterized by a high 
consistency across different domains, task complexities, and even test approaches 
(sequential vs. adaptive testing). Another interesting pattern of results is under discussion: 
The magnitude of the I > C phenomenon differs in accordance with the performance level 
of the examinee. More capable examinees showed a larger difference between their 
response latencies for incorrect and correct answers (Beckmann et al., 1997; Beckmann, 
2000a). Whereas the findings give very strong evidence for the generality of the I > C 
phenomenon, the pattern of results supporting the differential universality of this 
phenomenon is more heterogeneous (e.g., Hornke, 1997; Rammsayer, 1999, who reported 
no such differential effects of the I > C phenomenon). However, the seemingly differential 
universality of the I > C phenomenon raises the question of what poor performers do 
differently in untimed reasoning tests besides solving fewer problems. The analyses 
conducted by Beckmann (2000) show that there is no performance level-related difference 
regarding the latencies for correct responses, but there is regarding incorrect responses. 
Low performers tend to give their incorrect responses faster than do more successful 
performers. Does this mean that poor performers tend to give up too early in their attempts 
to solve the given reasoning problem? If so, latencies for incorrect responses might 
represent indicators for mental effort spent on hard items. Or do poor performers have to 
be faster than their more capable counterparts because of their “lower time horizon”? In 
other words, their limited capacity to process information might lead them to a seemingly 
too hasty pace while working on complex items. The latter speculative explanation puts 
the focus back on mental efficiency as the construct potentially covered by latencies.  
Aim of the study 
The goal of the study is twofold. First, we want to learn more about the mechanisms of the 
feedback–performance relation by analyzing the effects of feedback not only on 
performance scores but also on the time behavior in an untimed performance test. This 
introduces the second perspective in this study, the question about the meaning of 
response latencies in untimed performance tests. The study of relationships between 
individual differences in time behavior and non-intellectual personality factors within 
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different test settings is supposed to shed light on the still open question of the validity of 
response latencies in untimed power tests. 
To pursue these goals, hypotheses from three complexes need to be tested. The 
first group of hypotheses deals primarily with the replication of previous findings 
regarding the I > C phenomenon. In accordance with the assumption of the generality of 
the I > C phenomenon, latencies for incorrect responses should be longer than latencies for 
correct responses both under non-feedback conditions and feedback conditions (generality 
hypothesis). To test for evidence for the differential universality of the I > C phenomenon, 
the individual differences between latencies for correct and incorrect responses are 
expected to be larger for more capable subjects (universality hypothesis), independent of 
whether feedback is provided or not. The second set of hypotheses deals with direct effects 
of feedback. According to the discussion in the literature, simple correct/incorrect 
feedback should at best result in rather moderate positive effects on performance scores 
(performance hypothesis). One potential explanation for the limited performance-related 
feedback effects may be a higher level of worry cognition under feedback conditions 
(worry hypothesis). Besides the processing of feedback information as a potential self-
threat, the provision of item-by-item feedback on the other hand should allow for a more 
realistic estimation of one’s performance level (confidence-performance hypothesis).  
The third set of hypotheses strives for a synopsis of ability- and personality-related 
factors and their relationships to individual differences in time behavior. Here, hypotheses 
need to be tested concerning whether non-intellectual personality factors such as worry or 
confidence can contribute to the prediction of time behavior in untimed reasoning tests 
independently of the person’s level of ability (validity hypothesis–worry, validity 
hypothesis–confidence). 
Method 
Participants 
A sample of 120 eighth and ninth graders from a northern England middle school 
voluntarily participated in our study. Participants range in age from 12 to 15 years old (M 
= 13.9, SD = 0.6), and 51 percent of them were female.  
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Instruments 
The performance score on a set of 12 reasoning problems in the numerical domain 
(number series completion paradigm) served as the main dependent variable. The 
computerized test administration followed the principles of a power test procedure 
(increasing complexity of items, no time limit employed). In each item a series of 7 
numbers had to be completed by providing the eighth link for the given series. The three 
easiest items (complexity level I) can be described as first-order arithmetic series (e.g., 44, 
38, 32, 26, 20, 14, 8, ?) where the rule can be described by the subtraction or addition of a 
constant (e.g., “–6” in the given example). The next three items (complexity level II) are 
second-order arithmetic series (e.g., 3, 4, 6, 9, 13, 18, 24, ?). Here the rule is more 
complex because the rule itself represents a first-order arithmetic series with a constant 
operation (e.g., “+1, +2, +3, …”). Items for which the determination rule uses 
multiplication or division belong to the category of geometric series and they therefore 
represent items in complexity level III. The rule to find the correct completion of a series 
like 64, 16, 12, 48, 52, 13, 9, ? can be described as series of a constant operand in 
combination with a series of three different operations (that is: “/4, +4, *4, /4, …”). The 
most difficult items in the test (complexity level IV) represent geometric series for which 
the rule combines the systematic change of the operation and the operand. For a number 
sequence belonging to the category of second order geometric series like 5, 6, 12, 14, 42, 
45, 180, ? the rule would be “+1, *2, +2, *3, +3, *4, …”.   
In addition to the number of correct completions of the series, the latencies for 
each response were also recorded. The median response latencies for correct and incorrect 
answers were calculated for each subject. The difference of the median latency for correct 
and incorrect responses divided by the median latency for correct responses represents the 
individual I > C ratio. 
After being presented with two example items on the computer screen, a low 
complexity item (as described for complexity level I) and a more complex one 
(representative for complexity level IV), the participants were asked to give their opinions 
to the following statements: 
• “I am afraid I may not do as well on this test as I could” vs. “I am pretty optimistic that 
I will do as well on this test as I can.” 
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• “I feel pretty confident that I shall be able to solve most of the problems” vs. “I do not 
feel confident that I shall be able to solve most of the problems.” 
The first set of statements is supposed to tap the participants’ level of situation-
specific a priori worries as a component of task-related test anxiety. The second set of 
statements aims at identifying their task-related self-confidence. 
The sentences in each statement represent the two extremes of an analogous scale 7 
centimeters in length. The individual levels of worry and self-confidence, respectively, 
were operationalized by the graphic line segment on which participants had to place a 
mark indicating their response.  
After finishing the reasoning test the same questions were administered again. 
Participants were asked to give their opinions to the following statements in respect to the 
level of a posteriori worry: “I am afraid I may not have done as well on this test as I 
could” vs. “I think I have done as well on this test as I could,” and in respect to the a 
posteriori level of task related self-confidence: “I think I have done well” vs. “I think I 
have done poorly.” These scores were recoded so that high scores stand for a high level of 
worry or high level of confidence, respectively.  
Experimental design 
Participants were randomly assigned to two experimental conditions. In one condition 
participants received item-by-item feedback regarding the correctness of the answer given. 
Participants in the control condition received no feedback. According to test scores 
collected independently of this study, both groups (no feedback group, NFB– = 60, and 
feedback group, NFB+ = 60) did not differ in terms of their psychometric intelligence3 
(mean IQFB– = 105.0 [SD = 11.5]; mean IQFB+ = 106.7 [SD = 9.9]; F[1,118] = 0.76 p > .05).  
Procedure 
The test sessions took place in the school’s computer lab, and approximately 15 students 
participated per group session. Two test administrators were present in each session, one 
                                                
3 IQ-estimations derive either from the Middle Years Information System (MidYIS, Durham University) for 
eighth graders, or the Cognitive Abilities Test (CAT, Thorndike & Hagen, 1993) for ninth graders, 
respectively. The MidYIS contains tasks to assess vocabulary, mathematical skills, information processing 
speed, spatial abilities, and reasoning abilities (see also www.midyisproject.org). The CAT assesses 
reasoning ability based on 10 subtests in three domains. For both instruments UK-specific national norms 
exist. 
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of the authors and a teacher. Each participant worked on his or her own. The test session 
started by providing a general instruction about the kind of problems to be solved. Then 
each participant worked on the computer at a self-paced tempo.  
Results 
In terms of the generality hypothesis it is expected that the I > C phenomenon emerges 
independently of test conditions (no-feedback vs. feedback). A multivariate analysis of 
variance with repeated measures (latencies for correct and latencies for incorrect) and the 
between subject factor “feedback” (no-feedback vs. feedback condition) reveals a 
significant main effect for  latencies (F[1,118] = 93.238, p < .001). At the same time, the 
nonsignificant main effect for test conditions (F[1,118] = 0.714, p > .05) indicates that 
feedback does not have any substantial effect on time behavior. There is also no 
significant difference in the I > C phenomenon between the two test conditions 
(F[1,118] = 2.049, p > .05). 
Table 1 represents the mean latencies for incorrect responses and correct responses 
under the different test conditions. 
 
Table 1: The I > C Phenomenon in Different Test Conditions 
 Test Condition 
Latencies No Feedback Feedback 
Incorrect responses 57.58 (30.87) 52.70 (24.98) 
Correct responses 27.92 (10.37) 30.70 (12.59) 
Note. Time in seconds; values in parentheses are the standard deviations. 
 
As stated in the universality hypothesis, the lower the performance level of the 
given examinee, the smaller the difference is expected to be between latencies for correct 
and incorrect responses. Based on the results of univariate regression analyses computed 
for each condition, the performance level and the I > C ratio share about 25% of variance 
under no-feedback conditions, and 23% variance under feedback conditions, respectively. 
The I > C phenomenon shows a differential universality consistently across test 
conditions. 
The performance hypothesis deals with the question of whether feedback causes 
differences in test performance. Whereas under no-feedback conditions an average of 7.98 
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(SD = 2.22) items were solved correctly, the feedback sub-sample was successful on 7.23 
items (SD = 1.95). This unexpected performance difference in disfavor of the feedback 
condition fails to pass the two-tailed threshold of statistical significance (t[118] = 1.96, p = 
.052). Under the given circumstances (sample sizes, selected alpha level of 5%, two 
tailed), it can merely be concluded that feedback does not cause medium effects (d ≈ 0.50) 
on performance. In contrast to our initial expectations, the results of this analysis refer 
potentially to a moderate decline in performance under test conditions in which simple 
correct/incorrect feedback is provided. 
In accordance with the worry hypothesis, which was supported post hoc by the 
previously reported findings, it is expected that processing simple correct/incorrect 
feedback during performance tests does not necessarily provide the examinee with helpful 
information about potentially successful problem-solving strategies. On the contrary, such 
feedback information might rather increase the amount of worry cognitions while tackling 
the items. The significant interaction of test condition and level of worry before and after 
the test (see Figure 1) confirms this assumption (F[1,118] = 4.366. p = .039). Whereas the 
worry level before the test does not differ between the two sub-samples (no-feedback: 3.61 
[SD = 2.13], feedback: 3.53 [SD = 2.19]), the level of worry cognitions caused by 
experiences during the test is apparently intensified by the item-by-item feedback (no-
feedback: 3.50 [SD = 2.35], feedback: 4.37 [SD = 2.33]).  
 
0
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level of 
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Figure 1. Levels of task-related worry before and after the test depending on test 
condition. 
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With the confidence-performance hypothesis the question was raised whether the 
provision of simple correct/incorrect feedback leads to a more adequate self-judgment of 
one’s level of ability. In this case the relationship between the level of confidence reported 
immediately after the test and the actual level of performance is expected to be closer 
under feedback conditions. This research question calls for a moderator analysis (Aguinis, 
2004; Baron & Kenny, 1986; Bartussek, 1970; Jäger, 1978; Saunders, 1956, 1966)4. The 
Multivariate Moderated Regression (MMR) analysis shows that the relationship between 
the level of confidence and performance is not moderated by feedback (see nonsignificant 
increase in R2, or the nonsignificant standardized β weight of the moderator term, 
respectively, in Table 2). Feedback does not lead to a more realistic estimation of one’s 
own level of ability.  
 
Table 2: Test for a Moderator Effect of Feedback on the Relationship Between 
Performance and Confidence 
Step Variables Entered Standardized Coefficients R2 change F 
1 confidence 
feedback 
.526 (6.83) * 
-.152 (-1.97) * .308 26.01 * 
2 
confidence 
feedback 
confidence x feedback 
.613 (5.46) * 
-.011 (-0.07) 
-.181 (-1.06) 
.007 1.12 
Note. Values in parentheses represent t-values. The degrees of freedom for the F-test of R2 change in the step 
1 model are (2,117) and for the step 2 model are (1,116). * significant on α ≤ .05.  
 
Post hoc, this result can be seen as in harmony with the worry-related findings. The 
increase of (rather unrealistic) worries under feedback conditions does not necessarily put 
the examinee in a better position for a more appropriate self-judgment regarding his or her 
level of ability. On the other hand, the bivariate correlation between the level of 
                                                
4 Often, for testing these kind of hypotheses the correlational method is employed. This bears at least two 
serious problems. First, if the variance in the independent variable (in our case: confidence) differs between 
the two subsamples (no-feedback vs. feedback) the correlation between confidence and performance will be 
(artificially) reduced in the subsample in which the variance is smaller. The effect virtually caused by the 
restriction of range will then inappropriately be interpreted as a “true” effect. Second, if the measurement 
error in the dependent variable differs as a function of the moderator variable spurious differences in 
correlations will be the result. This means in our case, if the performance measure under feedback condition 
contains more error variance than under no-feedback condition then the correlation between confidence and 
performance under feedback condition will be (artificially) smaller. Since regression coefficients are not 
influenced by differences in variances it is strongly recommended to use the method of moderated multiple 
regression (MMR). 
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confidence and performance under no-feedback conditions of r = .57 clearly indicates that 
examinees do have a fairly realistic picture about their performance level even without 
receiving any information about the accuracy of their responses. 
The final set of hypotheses deals with whether time behavior can be explained by 
non-intellectual personality factors. Therefore the regression of time behavior (I > C-ratio) 
on either the level of worry experienced during the test or the level of confidence acquired 
during the course of the test is calculated. Since we are interested in the unique portion of 
variance in the time behavior that could potentially be explained by these predictors, we 
needed to control for the examinee’s level of intellectual ability (IQ). As we have learned 
from the analysis in relation to the worry hypothesis, examinees tend to produce a higher 
level of worry under test conditions in which simple correct/incorrect feedback is 
provided. Based on this result in extension of the validity hypothesis–worry we might 
expect a higher relationship between time behavior and worry under feedback conditions. 
If so, the test condition (no-feedback vs. feedback) serves as a moderator of the 
relationship between worry and the I > C ratio. To test this hypothesis a MMR5 analysis 
was conducted (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Test for a Moderator Effect of Feedback on the Relationship Between Worry and 
Time Behavior (I > C Ratio) When Controlling for Intellectual Ability (IQ) 
Step Variables Entered Standardized Coefficients R2 change F 
1 
IQ 
worry 
feedback 
.262 (2.88) * 
-.088 (-0.96) 
.205 (-0.11) 
.097 4.16 * 
2 
IQ 
worry 
feedback 
worry x feedback 
.262 (2.88) * 
-.065 (-0.50) 
-.068 (-0.39) 
-.056 (-0.27) 
.001 0.07 
Note. Values in parentheses represent t-values. The degrees of freedom for the F-test of R2 change in the step 
1 model are (3,116), for the step 2 model they are (1,115). * significant on α ≤ .05.  
 
The results of this MMR analysis do not qualify feedback as a moderator of the 
relationship between time behavior and level of worry during the test. Although the worry 
                                                
5 For all MMRs reported in this paper the assumption of homogeneity of the error variances is tested by 
utilizing the routines provided at http://carbon.cudenver.edu/~haguinis/mmr/. 
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level is increased in the feedback condition, its relevance as a potential determinant of 
time behavior in the test does not change. The result for the Step 1 model in Table 3 
reveals also that worry does not predict time behavior during the test when controlled for 
IQ. 
An analogous analysis for testing the validity hypothesis–confidence was 
conducted. Here the research question was whether the time behavior in the untimed 
reasoning test depends—at least partially—on the examinee’s level of confidence.  
 
Table 4. Test for a Moderator Effect of Feedback on the Relationship Between Confidence 
and Time Behavior (I > C Ratio) When Controlling for Intellectual Ability (IQ) 
Step Variables Entered Standardized Coefficients R2 change F 
1 
IQ 
confidence 
feedback 
.245 (2.53) * 
.093 (0.97) 
-.118 (-1.33) 
.097 4.17 * 
2 
IQ 
confidence 
feedback 
confidence x feedback 
.240 (2.44) * 
.124 (0.89) 
-.070 (-0.39) 
-.061 (-0.30) 
.001 0.09 
Note. Values in parentheses represent t-values. The degrees of freedom for the F-test of R2 change in the step 
1 model are (3,116), for the step 2 model they are (1,115). * significant on α ≤ .05. 
 
The results in Table 4 give no support for the validity hypothesis–confidence. 
Similar to the results for worry as a potential predictor of time behavior, confidence is not 
related to the I > C ratio when controlled for IQ. Time behavior seems to be independent 
from the level of confidence, consistent across different test conditions.  
Discussion 
The study presented focused primarily on the effects of feedback on performance in an 
untimed reasoning test. However, the operational perspective on test performance shall 
widen with the consideration of response latencies in addition to the number of correct 
answers. This serves the secondary goal of this study, to learn more about the meaning of 
latencies in untimed power tests and their potential value as a source of additional 
diagnostic information.  
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To address these research questions, an experimental design was chosen: A set of 
number series problems with open-answer format had to be solved either under standard 
conditions (no feedback) or under feedback conditions (item-by-item correct/incorrect 
feedback). Feedback is seen as an important intervention strategy in the framework of 
psychological assessment. On one hand, there are reasons to be optimistic that the 
provision of feedback during the test is not only helpful for the examinee to improve his or 
her performance but also helpful for the examiner to gain valuable information above and 
beyond what is gained if tests are administered in the traditional, non-dynamic way. This 
optimism is nurtured by empirical findings from studies evaluating the incremental 
validity of learning tests in which the provision of feedback is one important feature 
(Beckmann, 2001; Guthke & Wiedl, 1996). On the other hand, numerous findings from 
feedback research reduce the optimism regarding the beneficial effects of feedback on test 
performance (e.g., Kluger & DeNisi, 1996).  
In the study presented, the performance scores (number of correct responses) of 
participants on the number series problems under feedback conditions did not differ 
positively from those who worked without feedback. Rather, a slightly negative effect of 
feedback on performance occurred. This result is in line with findings from other 
feedback-oriented studies (Delgado & Prieto, 2003; Rousseau & McKelvie, 2000; Stankov 
& Crawford, 1997), in which no or even negative feedback effects on test performance 
were reported.  
That test condition (non-feedback vs. feedback) does not serve as a moderator of 
the relationship between confidence and performance in the study presented suggests that 
examinees do not gain new insight into their performance level when feedback is 
provided. Rather, it is more likely that simple correct/incorrect feedback is interpreted as 
mainly evaluative information. In this respect, the feedback “wrong” in particular might be 
processed as a potential threat to the examinees’ self esteem (see also MacLeod, Williams, 
& Bekerian, 1991). This interpretation is supported by another finding in our study: 
Examinees working under feedback conditions reported a significantly higher level of 
worried thoughts after the test.  
Worry may affect an allocation of attentional resources, which results in an 
absence of feedback benefits or even in performance deficits (see also Morris, Davis, & 
Hutchings, 1981; Thompson, Webber, & Montgomery, 2002). As a consequence of worry 
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in a study by Metzger, Miller, Cohen, Sofka, and Borkovec (1990), impaired performance 
and even slowed response latencies in solving categorization tasks with feedback were 
reported. Interestingly, in our study the increase in worry under feedback is not reflected 
in examinees’ time investment. According to Davis and Montgomery (1997), worried 
cognitions are associated with reduced problem-solving confidence, delays in decision-
making, and poor performance (see also Dugas, Letarte, Rhéaume, Freeston, & 
Ladouceur, 1995). Our results indicate neither any effect of feedback on response latencies 
nor on confidence ratings but they do give evidence for an increased level of worry and a 
tendency toward performance decline. 
Although a process-oriented approach—not only in the assessment of intellectual 
capacities—is often claimed to be more appropriate than the predominant product-oriented 
approach (merely reflecting on the number of total correct answers), little is known about 
the validity of potential process variables. By analyzing the meaning of response latencies 
the question is addressed whether time behavior in power tests can serve as such a 
process-oriented variable. 
As mentioned before, in previous studies focusing on time behavior in untimed 
performance tests, it was consistently found that latencies for incorrect answers are longer 
than those for correct answers, independently from the item paradigms employed, the 
complexity of the items, and the test presentation modes. The I > C phenomenon is 
replicated in the study presented under both the non-feedback condition and the feedback 
condition. This result gives further support for the generalizability of the I > C 
phenomenon. In respect to the also hypothesized differential universality of the I > C 
phenomenon, the I > C ratio was found to be larger the higher the performance level. 
However, the performance-related I > C effect was not affected by test condition.  
The overall perspective on the findings in the study presented suggests that the 
I > C phenomenon is “merely” related to the examinee’s level of capacity. We gained no 
support for the assumption that time behavior in untimed reasoning tests is at least 
partially determined by non-intellectual personality factors such as worry or confidence 
experienced while solving the items.  
We still do not know the exact meaning of response latencies in untimed 
performance tests, but at least we might know better now what their meaning is not. 
Further research attempts should concentrate on the evaluation of the relevance of 
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latencies as a process-oriented and ability-related variable (see Danthiir et al. or Hornke, 
both in this issue).  
With respect to feedback in performance tests, based on the results reported here, 
we can conclude that the provision of simple correct/incorrect feedback in performance 
tests is not helpful, since it (a) does not contain any “new” or helpful information when the 
examinee is familiar with the test demands, and (b) causes worry, which interferes 
potentially with task-related information processing. Our suggestion to test administrators 
therefore must be: Do not provide feedback! Our recommendation to test takers is: Try to 
ignore it if it is provided! 
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 Apendix 
 
Descriptives and Correlations of the Measures for the Subsample Working under No-Feedback Condition (N = 60).  
Measure M SD conf 1 conf 2 wrry 1 wrry 2 perform lat corr lat incorr I > C-ratio 
confidence pre 4.77 1.38         
confidence post 3.42 1.89 .41        
worry pre 3.61 2.13 -.18 -.35       
worry post 3.50 2.35 -.27 -.55 .53      
performance 7.98 2.22 .47 .57 -.17 -.37     
latency correct 27.92 10.37 .08 -.10 .19 .03 -.09    
latency incorrect 57.58 30.87 .24 .16 .11 -.11 .42 .27   
I > C-ratio 1.23 1.08 .27 .27 -.09 -.13 .49 -.42 .70  
IQ 105.06 11.45 .30 .51 -.04 -.22 .65 -.29 .13 .34 
 
 
 
Descriptives and Correlations of the Measures for the Subsample Working under Feedback Condition (N = 60). 
Measure M SD conf 1 conf 2 wrry 1 wrry 2 perform lat corr lat incorr I > C-ratio 
confidence pre 4.13 1.90         
confidence post 3.22 1.01 .27        
worry pre 3.53 2.19 -.34 -.10       
worry post 4.37 2.33 -.27 -.54 .25      
performance 7.23 1.95 .13 .50 .08 -.53     
latency correct 30.70 12.59 .06 -.15 -.02 .10 -.18    
latency incorrect 52.70 24.98 .07 .16 .03 -.19 .58 -.07   
I > C-ratio 0.99 1.20 .02 .13 .01 -.16 .49 -.57 .77  
IQ 106.72 9.92 -.03 .29 -.07 -.25 .46 -.12 .23 .23 
 
